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Joined 2 years ago
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Cake day: June 22nd, 2023

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  • This is exactly how I used to see things when I grew up in a conservative echo chamber.

    And now that I recognize a person’s right to choose and tend to think capital punishment should probably* not be legal, I’ll add that it’s not that my underlying beliefs changed, just how I now understand things. Some people do deserve capital punishment. And innocent people should be protected. But personhood doesn’t start at conception, a person conceiving has a right to decide what happens to their body, and the state can never be trusted to administer capital punishment.

    *I say “probably” because I also think it might be necessary to allow it in extreme cases. My reasoning is that if people don’t believe the justice system will adequately punish, they have incentive and no ultimate detergent for taking justice into their own hands.







  • “Incomplete paper and online applications will not be accepted,” Evans said in the statement. (Parker’s [demonstration] cancellation request would have lacked a driver’s license number.) The Secretary of State’s Office did not respond to individual questions about what testing the portal underwent before launch, the system’s security procedures, what happened to Parker’s cancellation request…

    Yeah, that tells us we just don’t know if this was a problem after all. Evans’s statement basically claims it wasn’t a vulnerability. If that’s correct, then the worst thing might be if someone’s browser tripped on the validation JS and allowed them down a blind alley execution path. If the claim is correct and if the page’s JS never shits the bed, then in that case the only negative outcome would be someone dicking with the in-browser source could lead themselves down the blind alley, in which case who cares. The only terrible outcome seems like it would be if the claim is incorrect–i.e. if an incomplete application submission would be processed, thus allowing exploit.

    Short of an internal audit, there’s no smoking gun here.






  • If they control the domain, they can see all incoming mail delivery attempts to sniff for addresses that were used. They’d still have to know the domain of the email address for the login they were attacking, which might not be super useful if they’re going after a certain login. But, going the other direction would be more fruitful: buy a domain, dump all incoming mail into a catch-all box, and start looking for bank alert emails or other periodic/promo emails. You might find services that just use email addresses for a login name, or ones that have a “forgot username” feature that only uses email for recovery. Multi-factor auth spread across multiple services (email, SMS, authenticator codes…) would help mitigate significantly by making them also have to take over a phone number or get an old device. Not impossible, but then you’re making them work harder for it, and when good account recovery services heavily mask the available targets, it makes it harder to know what else to acquire (e.g., a specific phone number) even if they get as far as full email domain control.